




National Dialogue Process in Mozambique

WHITE PAPER

A Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition Publication (2025)

Crisis in Zimbabwe
coalition
a time to act

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1. Introduction

Mozambique has a chequered history of conflict and disputed elections. The most recent election held on October 9, 2024 which decided on the President, the 250 members of the Assembly, and members of the ten provincial assemblies was consequential despite being of poor quality. The results were a political earthquake, because they redrew the political map. The political topography since the first multiparty elections in 1994 was shattered as the support base for the then-main opposition party, the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), collapsed, with many of its supporters abstaining, and youth voters, especially in the urban and peri-urban areas of Matola, Maputo, Nampula City, and Nampula Port, voting for opposition candidate Venancio Mondlane and the political party he affiliated to as presidential candidate, the Partido Otimista pelo Desenvolvimento de Moçambique, PODEMOS (however, he is not a PODEMOS party member).¹ On 24 October the National Electoral Commission (CNE) announced that Daniel Chapo won the election with 71% of

the vote and a declining electorate turnout of 43%. It also declared that the ruling party, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) won all the provincial elections and 195 of the 250 seats in parliament.

RENAMO rejected the results and called for a fresh election. The Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM), another opposition party, also rejected the results and declared that it had won 15 seats, not 4. Mondlane also rejected the results, triggering a wave of violent post-election conflict in Mozambique. In fact, shortly after the elections were held in October, Mondlane pre-emptively declared himself President-elect, with 53% of the vote and claimed that PODEMOS won a slim majority, with 138 seats based upon a parallel count from their own election agents.


FRELIMO was totally unprepared for Mondlane's pre-emptive claim as presidential victor, including his refusal to compromise and his ability to mobilise nationwide disruptive protests. This resulted,

¹ Alex Vines - <https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/mozambiques-electoral-earthquake-what-next-199096>

from mid-October 2024 till mid-January 2025, in widening protests across Mozambique, that over time became violent leaving devastating effects claiming lives and disturbing economic activity in the country and the entire SADC region. Approximately, over 350 people were killed, with security forces blamed for many deaths. They were also accused of using excessive force, including live bullets, against demonstrators. As a result, the authorities also claimed that a number of police officers died.

Finally, on 23 December 2024, the Constitutional Court (CC) – the only institution under Mozambican law that can consider challenges and sign off on the elections – published and validated the election results, subtracting seats from FRELIMO and allocating 12 more seats to PODEMOS, 8 more to RENAMO, and 4 more to MDM. It also downgraded Chapo's presidential share of the vote to 65.1% and increased Mondlane's to 24.1% (see Figures 1 and 2). Despite these adjustments to the results, violence escalated. In a 24 February 2025 pronouncement, Chapo described the pro-democracy protests as one of Mozambique's major security threats, comparing them to the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. He pledged to 'shed blood' to stop the unrest – a statement widely [condemned](#) by national and international human rights organisations.

The results of Mozambique's 2024 Presidential election



Source: Mozambique's Constitutional Council

2. Background

After attaining independence from the Portuguese colonial administration in June 1975, Mozambique plunged into a civil war from 1977 to 1992. The civil war started when RENAMO was formed by the Central Intelligence Organisation of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), after then-president Samora Moisés Machel started supporting the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) in its armed struggle against Rhodesia. Initially, RENAMO was a collection of FRELIMO dissidents and those soldiers who had fought together with the Portuguese during the colonial struggle, and was reportedly funded and supported by Rhodesia, apartheid South Africa, Portugal, West Germany, the United States (US) and Malawi.² This is the reason why even currently authorities routinely portray domestic grievances as foreign-driven plots to destabilise the country, using this narrative to justify violent crackdowns on opposition figures. After 1992, RENAMO transformed from being a rebel movement into a political party, led by Dhlakama – successor to a former Frelimo soldier, André Matsangaissa, who had died in 1979.

Since 1994, FRELIMO has won all elections, and RENAMO has consistently contested the outcome of the elections and threatened violence over allegations of electoral fraud and manipulation.³ Electoral complaints, as well as socio-economic and political grievances, led to the re-emergence of conflict in 2012. On 6 August 2019 the Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation (Maputo Accord) was signed in Mozambique, ending a period of low-level violence that had erupted seven years earlier between government security forces and armed elements of RENAMO. Since independence in 1975, Mozambique has been on a prolonged journey to peace and reconciliation. A protracted civil war ended in 1992 with the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) between the government and RENAMO. However, Mozambique returned to small-scale armed hostilities in 2012. This was due to RENAMO's dissatisfaction with the ongoing political situation and implementation of the GPA. Discontent with access to pensions, decentralisation and perceptions of a lack of full inclusion remained.

² Morgan, Glenda (1990) Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of Renamo. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28 (4), pp.603–619. See also Rupiya, Martin (1998) Historical Context: War and Peace in Mozambique. In Vines, Alex and Hendrickson, Dylan (eds) *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*. London: Conciliation Resources, p. 14.

³ Reppell, Lissa, Rozen, Jonathan and De Carvalho, Gustavo (2016) Planning for Peace – Lessons from Mozambique's Peacebuilding Process. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, 291 (June 2016), p. 5.

Following the outbreak of violence in 2012, mediation efforts to return Mozambique to peace can be divided into three periods: (1) National Mediation (2013-2015), including faith leaders and a university rector; (2) the Avenida process (2016), which involved a high number of external mediators and actors; and (3) the post-2016 process, which led to the signing of the Maputo Accord. This third period took stock of the failures of the first two processes and adopted a new approach based on trust and national ownership. However, this elitist approach which was political parties centric has failed to ensure sustainable peace in Mozambique. In light of the October 2024 post-election violence, the state responded with


violent repression. Over 350 people were reportedly killed by police gunfire, and around 4 000 were detained. Mondlane's followers were harassed, murdered, and faced politically motivated legal proceedings. The crackdown escalated into full-blown violence. Mondlane fled the country and went into exile at an undisclosed location. From there, he began broadcasting live messages via Facebook, urging nationwide resistance. The violence had significant economic repercussions. Referring to the Ministry of Finance's budget report, 360 Mozambique reported that 'the Mozambican economy grew by just 1.9 per cent in 2024, far below the 5.5 per cent initially forecast, due to the impact of the post-election demonstrations'.

3. Understanding Dialogue

In this context, to address the myriad of challenges that Mozambique has been experiencing, constructive national dialogue can be a vital pathway. Dialogue plays an essential role in diagnosing the problem to address the fundamental question of where the country's future is heading to? The key question about the national question that binds the nation together. Therefore, only a sincere, open and transparent dialogue process can achieve the kind of transformation that Mozambique desperately desires. This process will enable the country to genuinely charter a national vision that the country has lacked over the years. To achieve this, it is critical to have a comprehensive dissection of the problem. This will entail understanding the complexity of the problem, with its various components. Disabling the various components of the problem, examining them individually. A careful examination

allows us to put the pieces together and question assumptions and underlying issues and interrogate solutions for the future progress. As alluded by Strive Masiyiwa, the basic tenet of solving problems is the ability to understand and define the issue at hand. The problem must be pinpointed with some level of specificity, for concrete and pragmatic solutions to be proposed. The process in its entirety must be concrete, comprehensive and evidence-based with its practicalities and the mechanics. So, can one convene a national broad-based dialogue? To start with, it is necessary to convene a national representative convention that includes virtually every sector: students, religious establishments, political parties, think tanks, civil society, business, government, labour and self-regulating professions.

Dialogue Spaces



4. Towards an Inclusive and Consequential Dialogue: **Key Issues to Consider**

The mediation of talks between the ruling party FRELIMO and opposition presidential candidate Venancio Mondlane and political parties with parliamentary representation may not be the best way forward to resolve the larger-than-political party issues at stake. Such a scenario is not only exclusionary but it also reduces the process into elite bargaining and politicised consensus-building. A more inclusive, transparent process is needed, whereby all citizens, through various representative associations, are provided a platform for comprehensive discussions that should culminate in concrete proposals and strategies to be considered for adoption and implementation by the government. This will enable for a more sustainable way to address the underlying issues of conflict and disputed elections that the country has experienced since the dawn of its independence in 1975. Therefore, dialogue should allow for genuine interaction and the exchange of different perspectives on the conflict, and can foster the countrywide and intergenerational consensus necessary for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

FRELIMO needs urgent reforms to secure its longer-term political survival. The country urgently needs a constitutional reform process that is people-centred to address some of the underlying challenges that Mozambique has been facing. The new constitution should be able to address institutional reforms in particular electoral processes which are currently designed to give the ruling party FRELIMO an advantage and reflects the political compromises made among political elites over the past thirty years. President Chapo will also need to navigate an intricate political landscape, carefully balancing the diverse interests of FRELIMO, while tackling urgent priorities, such as poverty, inequality and inclusive economic growth. Mozambique cannot afford another elite political pact as it will fuel further frustration, especially among the country's large and increasingly disillusioned youth, who remain excluded from the benefits of Mozambique's resource-driven economy. The challenges of today are as a result of exclusionary elite pacts that failed to address the fundamental reforms and the aspirations of the people of Mozambique.

A dynamic inclusive national dialogue framework (NDF) should be established, comprising all political parties, civil society organisations (CSOs), academia, labour, business, religious organisations and all representative stakeholders in Mozambique. The NDF should be mandated with four principal responsibilities: (1) to holistically identify the historically underlying and intersecting issues driving the Mozambican conflict and disputed elections; (2) to exchange and curate ideas and strategies on the way forward; (3) to implement comprehensive reforms including but not limited to constitutional reforms, electoral reforms and economic reforms; and (4) to establish a joint reforms implementation mechanism with a robust institutional framework for the monitoring, evaluation and review of the implementation of NDF reforms. This will lay the ground for a more sustainable negotiation process.

5. Process Design

Historically, most national dialogue processes have been political parties and political elites centric, alienating the voices of ordinary citizens. They have often been used by political elites as a tool to gain or reclaim political legitimacy, which has been limiting their potential for transformative change.⁴ Many countries have undergone national dialogues to manage political contradictions with examples like Benin (1990), South Africa (1991-1993), Yemen (2013-2014) and Afghanistan (2002) to mention but a few. Johan Galtung stressed the importance of “a thousand local dialogues” as an antidote to elitism and political exclusion.⁵ According to Dzikamai Bere, “truly effective solutions are born from listening to grassroots communities, not from centralized political decisions.”⁶ This proposed dialogue framework seeks to pivot the citizens to the centre of any meaningful dialogue process. To this end, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition’s conceptualisation of a solution to the Mozambican question is a two-track process that entails political settlement coupled with an all-

inclusive national dialogue. Track 1 features a political settlement by the dominant political foes and forces, and Track 2 features a concurrent and linked national, broad-based, all-inclusive dialogue featuring various interest groups (e.g., political parties, women, youth, civil society, faith-based entities, labour). In this two-track approach, each track is viewed as necessary but insufficient without the other. This document outlines the Coalition’s vision of political settlement in the context of that two-track process.

On account of the *status quo*, there is a decent dose of incentive for dialogue between FREMILO and other parties with Parliamentary representation, including Mondlane. This document posits that political settlement coupled with national dialogue is the best way out of the current political, social and economic crises, working with what is most ideal, as opposed to what is most likely. A political settlement (with broad civic buy-in) will lay a foundation for more robust, inclusive and sustainable national dialogue process, which will address structural challenges that go beyond partisan politics,

⁴ See Paffenholz, Thania & Zachariassen, Anne & Helfer, Cindy. (2017). What Makes or Breaks National Dialogues?.

⁵ <https://www.galtung-institut.de/en/home/johan-galtung/>

⁶ <https://cddmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Pathways-to-Transitional-Justice-in-Mozambique-.pdf>

and electoral and political reforms, leading to democratically contested, free, fair and credible elections where the people's will prevails, and an inclusive economy.

Sequencing

Political settlement and national dialogue need not necessarily be consecutive rather than simultaneous. Political settlement should be understood, from the outset, as merely the first step of a larger constitutionally-anchored process in which 1) participation in a follow-on national dialogue would be a fixed pre-commitment, and 2) the dialogue's eventual results would feed into policymaking. On a balance of probabilities, political settlement is likely to be the first step in the two-track process, and such a settlement would lay out the framework for a national dialogue. What is critical is that any political settlement is made conditional upon a separate, inclusive national dialogue that can run concurrently or come afterward.


Participation

While political settlement should be between the two main overt centres of political power, that is FRELIMO, Mondlane and other parties in Parliament, the real centres of power within these political establishments must be targeted to facilitate the full participation of the parties in the process. It is critical to prevent any political settlement between FRELIMO and Mondlane to the exclusion of other parties in Parliament, especially RENAMO which has participated in previous dialogues. Such a settlement would be less than genuine and disruptive. There are many potential benefits associated with greater participation directly inside political and peace talks. These include inserting different voices and perspectives, increasing the legitimacy and sustainability of the process, and deepening the sense of ownership, transparency and accountability for future implementation. These potential benefits can be helpful to a wide variety of processes, but especially to any high-profile negotiations with a transformative agenda. The process should be "inclusive enough", with only necessary parties on the table, expanding and shrinking flexibly and gradually over time to include other political forces and actors, in sync with the core goal of reaching a durable settlement as efficiently as possible.


The following diagram illustrates some possible relationships between participation and efficiency in political and peace negotiations, while recognising that other variables inform the relationship (e.g., the more trusted the negotiation team, the less pressure to expand participation; and vice versa for teams that are distrusted).

Participation Efficiency in Negotiations


POSITIVE OPTION




INDIFFERENT OPTION



NEGATIVE OPTION 1



NEGATIVE OPTION 2



The graphs illustrate the relationship between participation and efficiency that can exist across various negotiation formats, all else being equal. Each of the graphs shows how, when set against the dotted line representing the juncture at which a negotiation is considered “inclusive enough”, greater participation may make reaching an agreement inviable. As indicated by the black line in the four diagrams, the relationship between participation and efficiency can take different forms. In the first case (“positive option”), greater participation increases the efficiency of the negotiation. In the second case (“indifferent option”), greater participation neither helps nor hurts the efficiency of the negotiation. In the last two cases (“negative options”), greater participation decreases the efficiency of the negotiation – in the last example, nearly or actually destroying the process.

Process

Important lessons to be drawn from the previous Mozambique's history of elite political settlements (e.g.,) include the need to 1) avoid framing political settlement in a way that would simply buy time for FRELIMO to regroup, and 2) avoid a settlement that is inherently imbalanced, incapable of bringing necessary reforms. The following are key considerations for the process.

- The entire political settlement and national dialogue process should be seen as a long-term plan, with various steps.
- The agenda, process, rules of engagement, facilitator (and their role), dispute resolution mechanisms, location of talks, and the legally binding nature and enforceability of outcomes should be outlined in a **pre-discussion pact**, without any perceived pre-determined outcomes or skewing towards one of the parties.
- This would serve a functional purpose, and contribute to trust building. Discussions and agreement should be incremental in approach, while also allowing for partial agreements on urgent matters (e.g., economic stability and recovery policy) to be reached early on.
- Timing is key. Negotiations should ideally occur **in good time ahead of the next general elections**, prior to the fully-fledged campaign season. This is to avoid the destabilising effect of electioneering to talks.
- A neutral, widely acceptable **facilitator by both the parties and the public**, with sufficient regional and international clout and sway, is needed. Such a facilitator should get the backing of SADC and the African Union (AU) if possible, although not a pre-requisite, and the facilitator may be local. It is best to avoid facilitators with an active interest in the outcomes.

Outcome of Settlement/Dialogue

Political settlement should yield outcomes that are actionable. Firstly, the resultant settlement, as with the process, should:

- **Be locally-led:** by and for Mozambicans, with or without international support, and with full appreciation of the local context;
- **Be people-centred:** all discussions and agreements reached should have the needs of Mozambicans at the centre;
- **Have inclusive in participation:** from the onset, the process must model the inclusive attitudes, behaviours etc. that Mozambique requires, albeit at varying levels throughout the process and via different participation mechanisms;
- **Yield holistic solutions:** must yield solutions that are comprehensive and address “the problem” as a whole (should go beyond political questions);
- **Have collective ownership (with broad civic buy-in):** the process should be about joint problem solving (rather than casting blame) and be carried out in a spirit of

partnership with government, opposition, civil society, labour, churches, traditional leaders, and all other key sectors and actors;

- **Be a means to an end:** political settlement and national dialogue are but the first step of a larger process of reviving constitutionalism in Mozambique;
- **Be consensus based:** for any results to be perceived as legitimate, there must be broad-based consensus on both the need for dialogue and its design; and
- **Have legally binding outcomes:** the negotiations must be explicitly connected to, and reflective of, the values and standards of Mozambican's national constitution or new constitution, and be legally valid and therefore enforceable.

Secondly, the following should be an integral part of the actionable outcomes:

- a. **A clear path and framework for national dialogue.** The national dialogue would be the broad-based version of the political settlement articulated above, with largely the same principles applicable;
- b. **Political, institutional and electoral reforms** that would redesign the electoral management process, facilitate the independence of State institutions, and dismantle the architecture of violence;
- c. **Economic reforms** that would facilitate for a stable and inclusive economy and root out leakages and corruption;
- d. **A return to civilian politics** through demilitarising State institutions;
- e. **A roadmap to contested elections** under reforms and a reformed EMB; and
- f. **Amnesties**, where necessary, including a clear set of principles to be applied, and how this would be operationalised, which should be a part of broader national healing and reconciliation process.

Key to the success is to take stock of previous negotiations attempts. For example, one of the most recent attempts developed a new process based on the principle that this was not a process based on peace talks, but instead on peace listening (accord). A defining feature of mediation in Mozambique was the use of a system of “implementing while negotiating,” or “progressive implementation.”⁷ Key to the rebuilding of trust was the dedication shown by both sides to the use of dialogue and confidence building measures throughout the mediation and implementation phase. Confidence building measures became a strategic approach to moving the parties at the negotiating table towards the resolution of the conflict. This involved a mutual willingness to take calculated risks, which required openness, cooperation, and gestures of goodwill. Flexibility and willingness to take these risks particularly by the mediation team and the principals allowed the peace process to proceed despite numerous challenges. Nevertheless, lack of inclusion and ownership of the negotiation processes by the citizens has resulted in the failure of previous attempts at sustainable and successful national dialogues.

⁷ <https://www.gcsp.ch/sites/default/files/2024-12/SSA-39-Mediation-Mozambique-2024-09%3Bdigital.pdf>

6. Current Dialogue Efforts

A surprise meeting between Mozambican President Daniel Chapo and his main political rival, Venâncio Mondlane, took place on Sunday night, 23 March 2025, in Maputo. Discreetly facilitated by unnamed civil society members, the meeting marked the first in several expected dialogues to address the root causes of political violence that erupted after the 2024 general elections.⁸ Both domestic and international [observers](#) criticised the electoral process, finding evidence of widespread irregularities and fraud.

Mondlane said a joint task force comprising government representatives and individuals appointed by him had been established to oversee the implementation of these measures and prepare for further dialogue. Recent events have shown that excluding Mondlane – who enjoys considerable popular support – only fuels unrest. The government had initially launched talks with opposition groups, but deliberately sidelined him. The [outcome](#) – a political stability

⁸ <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/chapo-mondlane-meeting-presents-a-glimmer-of-hope-for-mozambique>

pact – was [signed](#) on 5 March 2025 by Chapo and minor political party leaders with limited public backing. As a precursor to this new development, FRELIMO and the opposition political parties, represented in parliament and the provincial assemblies – including Nova Democracia, led by MDM leader Lutero Simango – reached an agreement in late January 2025 on the terms of reference for reforms to how Mozambique is governed. Since early January 2025, negotiations with FRELIMO on a reform plan of action – **including decentralisation and electoral reform** – have been ongoing.

Inclusive Economic Growth and Development Agenda

The ongoing conflict may be viewed as a symptom of various challenges facing Mozambique as a country. Whilst the decentralisation merits discussion, the national dialogue should focus more on an economic transformation agenda. The NDF should exchange ideas on how Mozambique can establish capable institutions and comprehensive strategies to harness its resource potential and

comparative economic advantage for the benefit of its people. At the core of dialogue should be the grand question on how to revive and transform the post-conflict economy in Mozambique. In his article “Mozambique: ‘The War Ended 17 Years Ago, but We Are Still Poor,’ Joseph Hanlon argues that economic management strategies in post-civil war Mozambique exacerbated inequality and social exclusion, thereby creating a “serious risk of conflict.”⁹ Extreme poverty, poor service provision by the government, high unemployment and horizontal and vertical inequalities are obvious conflict ingredients all over the world.

Public Sector Reforms and Electoral Reforms

The demand by the Opposition for the government to facilitate the separation between public administration and political party is progressive. Fredson Guilengue refers to this politicisation of public institutions as the “Frelimization of the state,” arguing that government officials and their families have their influence in state institutions, the national economy and the media.¹⁰ This conflation compromises

the rule of law, accountability and anti-corruption control; threatens meritocracy in public administration; breeds patronage; affects the separation of powers; and erodes public trust and confidence in public institutions. All these create unnecessary tensions, polarisation and, ultimately, conflict. The proposed NDF should establish the state of public sector management in Mozambique, identify challenges and discuss policy reform proposals.

Regarding electoral reform, the proposed NDF should analyse the election processes that have been conducted so far in Mozambique to establish an electoral reform agenda. Regional and international statutes, for example the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance should also guide the electoral reform agenda. The latest election observer mission reports as well as media reports may be helpful. As previously indicated, most election observer missions deployed to Mozambique reported that the October 2024 elections were of poor quality. The European Union Election Observation Mission to Mozambique¹¹ and other credible missions proposed priority reforms which should be the fulcrum of any serious

⁹ Hanlon, Joseph (2010) Mozambique: ‘The War Ended 17 Years Ago, but We are Still Poor’. Conflict, Security & Development, 10 (1), p. 77.

¹⁰ Guilengue, Fredson (2013) ‘Mozambique: Why has Renamo Gone Back to the Bush?’ Pambazuka News, 28 November, Available at: <<https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/mo%C3%A7ambique-why-has-renamo-gone-back-bush>> [Accessed 9 January 2025].

¹¹ <https://www.eods.eu/library/EU%20EOM%20Mozambique%202024%20Final%20Report%20ENG.pdf>

electoral reform agenda. These priority recommendations for improving the way elections are organised, managed, and conducted in Mozambique are:

1. Review the structure, composition and selection process of the election administration at all levels to enhance professionalism, integrity, accountability and impartiality throughout all stages of the electoral process.
2. Review the results management system to ensure an efficient, uniform, consistent and transparent process, including: a quick system to announce provisional progressive results broken down by PS; and unambiguous procedures for rectifying errors and discrepancies in results protocols with clear criteria for the recount of ballots.
3. The CNE takes full responsibility for the integrity of the electoral process, by adopting measures to address the consequences of electoral offences and malpractices during voting, counting and tabulation of results to diminish their impact of the election results.
4. State authorities to protect fundamental freedoms, namely the right to freedom of assembly, access to information, and the conduct of peaceful manifestation and campaign activities in a safe environment, free from intimidation and violent acts against party members, supporters and journalists.
5. Establish and maintain reliable and cost-effective mechanisms to update the voter register, for example by using other existing and reliable data sources, such as a revised civil registry.
6. The process by which the Constitutional Council validates results to be detailed and with specific references to the normative provisions and criteria used to ground the decision.
7. Review and harmonise electoral laws to grant legal certainty and remove contradictions.
8. Strengthen the legal framework and oversight for campaign finance from private sources. Measures could include accountability mechanisms to reduce the opportunities for illicit financing, and reasonable campaign expenditure limitations to ensure equal opportunity and transparency.

The proposed NDF might use this as a basis to identify any gaps within the existing electoral system, so as to highlight areas in need of reform. As John Parker noted, “[U]ltimately, inclusive processes are better processes, [they facilitate] more informed deliberations, broader and deeper concurrence, resulting in more implementable and sustainable agreements.”¹²

¹² Packer, John (2013) ‘Challenges and Opportunities of Inclusivity in Peace Processes’, Available at: <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ChallengesOpportunitiesInclusivity_Packer_2013.pdf> [Accessed 23 December 2024].

7. The Role of Crisis Coalition


The Crisis Coalition role, working with like-minded local and regional civic groups is twofold: (1) to help create the conditions for political settlement and national dialogue, and (2) to provide thought-leadership and background supportive intervention during the political settlement talks and subsequent national dialogue.

As such, the Crisis Coalition may do the following:

- **Through targeted advocacy initiatives, help to create incentives for talks, and drive the narrative of political settlement and national dialogue** as the most feasible and ideal route to solving the Mozambique political crisis. This includes spotlighting the likely contestation and confrontation that would result from the 2029 elections if they are to proceed without reform, and the likely resultant legitimacy contestations. Positive framing of the two-track political resolution proposal is critical for bringing hope for change and acceptability of the proposal. Incentives could include political stability, inclusive economy and economic recovery, and amnesties.
- **Create avenues for emissaries and engagement of both FRELIMO, the Opposition and citizens representatives** – as well as key ‘behind the scenes’ stakeholders (e.g., security sector actors) – to warm up to the two-track process. The Coalition should contribute to effectively appealing to influential actors who are essential for dialogue and political settlement. This is important because there are hardliners in both camps who do not want dialogue and political settlement, while there are also moderates who view dialogue and political settlement as the way out.
- **Craft ideas through strategy papers and concrete proposals** on specific aspects or components of the two-track process and envisaged outcomes above (e.g., the ideal facilitator, mandate of the convenors of dialogues, amnesties, electoral reforms). These can then be concrete resources to participants in the two-track process.



- **Engage key local and regional leaders (e.g., business, civic, political, diaspora, religious) and the international community** to back-up a locally-driven process. The Coalition's Power Map is key in identifying relevant regional (e.g., SADC, AU, South Africa, Botswana) and international (e.g., USA, UK,) actors.
- **Pre-empt and discourage a political settlement of convenience** between FRELIMO and parties in Parliament, isolating Mondlane.
- **Drive public interest and engagement with the processes through building broad-based support for issues that are affecting Mozambicans indiscriminately** (across political, social, ethnic, age, gender, regional, etc. divides) and have the potential to 1) mobilise Mozambicans from all walks of life (with a focus on young Mozambicans and women), and 2) build the cohesion and justification needed to catalyse a two-track process of political settlement and national dialogue.

An illustration featuring four stylized human figures in profile, engaged in conversation. From left to right: a woman with short dark hair in a yellow shirt, a man with short dark hair in a green shirt, a man with short dark hair in a yellow shirt gesturing with his right hand, and a woman with long dark hair in a red shirt. Above them are several overlapping speech bubbles in shades of green, yellow, and red. In the center background, a red silhouette of the map of Mozambique is visible. The entire scene is set against a dark grey background.

National Dialogue Process in Mozambique

White Paper

A Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition Publication (2025)

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